From Status to Contract: Inheritance and Succession in George Eliot's Late Fiction by Poon, Phoebe
   
50 
 
 
 
From Status to Contract: 
Inheritance and Succession in 
George Eliot’s Late Fiction 
 
PHOEBE POON 
 
 
Despite the work of the ‘Law and Literature’ movement in illuminating 
the law’s representation in literary texts, it is a truth rarely acknowledged 
that the law is often present only in the subtext or margins of fictional 
narrative. As William P. MacNeil writes of law in nineteenth-century 
literature,  
 
Law, if present at all … in any substantive way, is often 
figured subtly, even elliptically—in a range of things: a lost 
deed, a long hidden testimonial, an unusual ‘law-hand’ [as in 
the case of Bleak House].1  
 
This article will focus on the legal marginalia that rise to prominence at 
certain moments in George Eliot’s last three novels—the ‘base fee’ that 
represents the Transomes’ interest in an estate in Felix Holt, the entail on 
Casaubon’s property that is questioned by Dorothea in Middlemarch, and 
the settlement of Sir Hugo Mallinger’s estates that ensures their future 
transmission to his nephew Grandcourt in Daniel Deronda. Through the 
realistic portrayal of how settlement, entail, and primogeniture operated 
in practice, Eliot transformed the inheritance plot from a well-worn 
convention of material reward for heroic conduct into a powerful vehicle 
of critique against anachronistic customs of inheritance and succession.  
 
In her later fiction, inheritance is revealed as a point of stress in 
relations between the individual and the family, particularly among the 
landed classes, for whom land was treated as a patrimony belonging to 
                                                 
1 William P. MacNeil, Novel Judgements: Legal Theory as Fiction (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2012), p.15. 
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the family, rather than to individual members of family. The aristocracy 
and (to a lesser extent) the landed gentry preferred the practice of settling 
the estate on the eldest son to a more straightforward bequest by will, as 
settlement could restrict the rights of the son to alienate part or all of the 
land from the patrimony. The holder of settled property therefore was not 
so much absolute owner as tenant for life, whose responsibility was to 
look after the land and transmit it intact to future generations.  As land 
law historian A.W.B. Simpson suggests,  
 
although the family … was not treated as a legal entity by 
the common law, which dealt only in individual property 
rights, landed society did nevertheless view property as 
ultimately belonging to the family in some moral sense, and 
the legal system reflected this.2  
 
Ironically, this regard for land as familial or communally-owned property 
made the English landowner appear less ‘the cultured man [who] acts 
more as an individual’ than ‘the peasant, [who acts] more as one of a 
group.’3 The distinction between communal and individualist mentalities 
that Eliot noted in her essay, ‘The Natural History of German Life’ 
(1856), chimed with a post-Enlightenment vision that saw the family, 
rather than the individual, as the basic foundation of society. It was a 
vision exemplified in Auguste Comte’s Course of Positive Philosophy 
(1853), in which he asserted that  
 
the family presents the true germ of the various 
characteristics of the social organism. Such a conception is 
intermediate between the idea of the individual and that of 
the species or society.4  
 
This idea of the family as mediator between the individual and 
society was also a major theme in Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law: 
Its Connection With the Early History of Society, and Its Relation to 
Modern Ideas (1861), a work of jurisprudence which Eliot read from 
                                                 
2 A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), p.209. 
3 George Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life,’ Westminster Review 66 
(July 1856): 51-79; rpt. in Essays of George Eliot, ed. Thomas Pinney (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p.274. 
4 The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, Vol. 2, trans. Harriet Martineau 
(1853; New York: Cosimo, 2009), ch. V, p.502. 
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November to December 1869 while she was working on Middlemarch. 
Within her eight pages of extant notes on Maine’s ‘legal best-seller,’5 
Eliot summarised one of Maine’s most enduring propositions thus: 
‘Society consists of Families, not of individuals.’6 The actual statement in 
Ancient Law—’the unit of an ancient society was the Family, of a modern 
society the Individual’—became the foundation of Maine’s celebrated 
dictum at the end of Chapter 5: ‘[T]he movement of the progressive 
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.’7 
Recasting the distinction between ancient and modern conceptions of 
society into a theory of social evolution, Maine shifted from sociological 
terminology (family/individual) to jurisprudential terminology 
(status/contract). Despite his reputation among his contemporaries as a 
jurist, he has been reclaimed since the 1980s as a somewhat forgotten 
pioneer of the social sciences, particularly sociology and anthropology. 
However, as Simon Petch has rightly pointed out, Maine’s status in 
literary studies remains ‘uncertain,’ as his hypothesis about the 
movement from status to contract is often cited, but rarely accorded any 
substantial significance.8 This article contends that Maine’s hypothesis 
offers a unique conception of how Victorians viewed their world as a 
modern legal culture increasingly defined by contractual relations forged 
between autonomous individuals, a culture that developed from ancient 
Indo-European societies, where a person’s legal status in the family had 
determined her rights and duties.  
 
While privileging individualism as the apotheosis of modernity, 
Maine’s status-contract model highlighted the deeply embedded vestiges 
of family-oriented custom in Victorian society. Three chapters of Ancient 
Law compare customs of inheritance and succession in the ancient and 
modern world: Chapters VI, VII, and VIII are titled ‘The Early History of 
Testamentary Succession,’ ‘Ancient and Modern Ideas Respecting Wills 
and Successions,’ and ‘The Early History of Property’ respectively. In a 
passage from Chapter VI, Maine wrote:  
                                                 
5 A. W. B. Simpson, ‘Contract: A Twitching Corpse,’ Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1 (1981): 268. 
6 George Eliot’s Middlemarch Notebooks, eds. John Clark Pratt and Victor A. 
Neufeldt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979), p.204. 
7 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of 
Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas, Foreword by Lawrence Rosen (1861; 
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986), p.121, 165.  
8 Simon Petch, ‘Law, Literature, and Victorian Studies,’ Victorian Literature and 
Culture 35 (2007): 381. 
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The popular or even the legal conception of a Will … [is] 
that a Will necessarily takes effect at death only, - that it is 
secret, not known as a matter of course to persons taking 
interests under its provisions, - that it is revocable, i.e. 
always capable of being superseded by a new act of 
testation. Yet I shall be able to show that there was a time 
when none of these characteristics belonged to a Will.9  
 
Maine subsequently revealed that, for Roman citizens, wills were 
irrevocable, public documents that took effect during the life of the 
testator. While the ancient Roman will was historically distant from the 
settlements and entails depicted in Eliot’s novels, its characteristics 
(entirely opposite to those of the modern will) clearly resembled the 
deeds of strict settlement that were used by the aristocracy and landed 
gentry to ensure that their estates descended intact to future generations. 
Although not in all instances completely irrevocable, a settlement was 
‘strict’ in the sense that conditions imposed by its original maker (the 
‘settlor’) were not easily revoked or modified. They were private family 
documents, but the need to ‘break’ or ‘bar’ existing entails and resettle 
the estate once every generation meant that the current holder of the 
estate (the ‘life tenant’) had to disclose the legal details to his successor 
(the ‘tenant in tail’); the contents of a settlement therefore were not 
necessarily secret. Finally, settlements did not, in many instances, take 
effect at death, as the procedure for ‘barring’ the entail usually occurred 
on one of three occasions—soon after the son’s majority, at his marriage, 
or at the time that the father made his will.10  
 
The entail was one of two main elements in a deed of settlement, the 
second being family provision—provision for the wife through jointure, 
and the younger children through fixed monetary sums or portions. As 
property devised to women became their husband’s upon their marriage, 
the entail enabled landowners to create a fixed order of succession that 
                                                 
9 Maine, Ancient Law, p.169. 
10 The advantage of inter vivos settlement, which took effect while father and son 
were still alive, rather than testamentary settlement, which took effect after the 
father’s death, was that the father could supervise the succession of his son and 
witness the ‘changing-of-the-guard’ in his lifetime. See John Habakkuk, 
Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System: English Landownership 1650-1950 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.26-9; Barbara English and John Saville, 
Strict Settlement: A Guide to Historians (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1983), 
pp.32-40. 
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kept the patrimonial estate intact in the male line. However, the 
maximum length of an entail was ‘a life or lives in being’ plus ‘a period 
in gross of twenty-one years.’11 This meant that land could be tied up ‘for 
three generations only, in the typical case a father, his eldest son, and his 
(unborn) eldest grandson until he was 21 years of age.’12 While 
incumbent life tenants could not reduce endless generations of unborn 
male descendants to a life tenancy, a chain of resettlements every 
generation virtually amounted to the creation of a perpetual entail. For 
landlords with dynastic ambitions, the ideal was to keep ‘a succession of 
life tenants on the family lands ad infinitum.’13 In this manner, their 
estates ‘would descend in the family generation after generation with 
never an absolute owner in possession,’ who had the capacity to alienate 
all or part of the property from the patrimony.14 Therefore, while the 
fundamental principle of land law was tenure, which limited 
landownership to an individual lifetime, settlements of landed property 
could provide for ownership in perpetuity not by individuals, but by 
families.  
 
In every ‘ideal’ legal situation, there are always loopholes or 
exceptions, a rare one of which is detailed in Felix Holt. Before a certain 
John Justus Transome in the eighteenth century had the opportunity to 
resettle his estate in the manner described above, his prodigal son 
Thomas had tried to bar the entail and exchange his future patrimony for 
cash:  
 
Thomas … proving a prodigal, had, without the 
knowledge of his father, the tenant in possession, sold his 
own and his descendants’ rights to a lawyer-cousin named 
Durfey; … therefore, the title of the Durfey-Transomes, in 
spite of that old Durfey’s tricks to show the contrary, 
depended solely on the purchase of the ‘base fee’ thus 
created by Thomas Transome; and … the Bycliffes were the 
                                                 
11 Cadell v. Palmer (1833) 1 Cl and F 372. See A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the 
Land Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.226; and J. H. Baker, An 
Introduction to English Legal History, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1979), 
p.245. 
12 F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p.64. 
13 Simpson, A History of the Land Law, p.236. 
14 Eileen Spring, Law, Land and Family: Aristocratic Inheritance in England, 
1300 to 1800 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), p.125. 
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‘remainder-men’ who might fairly oust the Durfey-
Transomes if ever the issue of the prodigal Thomas went 
clean out of existence, and ceased to represent a right which 
he had bargained away from them.15  
 
Without his father’s consent, Thomas could only partially ‘bar’ or ‘cut 
off’ the entail, that is, he could sell ‘his own and his descendants’ rights’ 
to the Transome estates, but not the rights of non-lineal descendants, 
namely the Bycliffes, known as the ‘remainder-men.’ The resulting legal 
interest from a partial barring was a mere ‘base fee,’ which attracted very 
little value on the market because its legal complexities rendered it a 
risky security for buyers and creditors. According to legal historian A. W. 
B. Simpson, a base fee was an interest in property founded on a 
contingency:  
 
The alienee [the purchaser of the fee] will be safe until the 
issue of the alienor [the seller] who were capable of 
inheriting under the entail die out.16  
 
In the event that the alienor’s issue does die out, the estate would revert to 
the remainder-men named under the original settlement. The alienee and 
his descendants could therefore be dispossessed of property that they had 
held for generations on the failure of the alienor’s family line. The family 
line might not perish (at least not before the alienee’s own), or it might 
take several generations and upwards from decades, if not centuries, to 
perish, but few buyers were willing to gamble their property on the 
continuation of a stranger’s progeny. Thomas Transome’s ‘lawyer-cousin 
Durfey,’ however, proves to be an exception, as he acquires the base fee, 
and changes his name to ‘Transome’ in order to trick others into 
believing that his title is more secure than it really is. 
 
Featuring one of the most complicated settlements in fiction (or 
indeed fact), Felix Holt has attracted criticism from many readers and 
critics, who were frustrated by the excessive technicality of the novel’s 
inheritance plot. As F. R. Leavis famously wrote: the  
 
                                                 
15 George Eliot, Felix Holt, the Radical, ed. Fred C. Thomson (1866; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p.239. 
16 Simpson, A History of the Land Law, p.91. 
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esoteric subtleties of the law of entail … demand of the 
reader a strenuousness of attention that, if he is an admirer of 
George Eliot, he is unwilling to devote.17  
 
While the base fee may have been rare in legal practice, its pivotal status 
in the plot led G. S. Venables in the Edinburgh Review to the insight that 
‘the law supplies to modern novels the place of that supernatural 
machinery which was once thought indispensable in epic composition.’18 
Venables saw the base fee as a modern deus ex machina, the improbable 
contrivance or contingency which hastens the characters to their tragic 
ends. The contingency that would deprive the Durfey-Transomes of their 
estate is eventually triggered by the death during an election riot of the 
last of the original Transomes, a déclassé Tommy ‘Trounsem’. This event 
makes Esther Lyon, who no one knows at first as the daughter of a 
Bycliffe, the rightful legal claimant. 
 
Taking into account the literary context of Felix Holt, the effect of 
the base fee is comparable with the sudden twists of fate commonly 
found in sensation fiction of the 1860s, which had a tendency to wipe out 
a number of male issue and open the way for an unlikely candidate to 
inherit a landed estate. A realist novel with some notable sensational 
narrative elements—working-class riots, adultery, clandestine affairs—
Felix Holt is elevated above the ‘low-brow’ sensation novel by the 
Aristotlean discourse of tragedy in which the Transome story is framed.19 
As the narrator writes in the ‘Introduction’:  
 
For there is seldom any wrong-doing which does not carry 
along with it some downfall of blindly-climbing hopes, some 
hard entail of suffering, some quickly-satiated desire that 
survives, with the life in death of old paralytic vice, to see 
itself cursed by its woeful progeny—some tragic mark of 
kinship in the one brief life to the far-stretching life that 
                                                 
17 F. R. Leavis, The Great Tradition (1948; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), 
p.63. 
18 [G. S. Venables], Review of Felix Holt, Edinburgh Review 124 (Oct. 1866): 
435-49; rpt. in George Eliot: The Critical Heritage, ed. David Carroll (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), p.280. 
19 Eliot’s diary entry on 15 June 1865 indicates that she ‘read again Aristotle’s 
Poetics, with fresh admiration.’ See The Journals of George Eliot, ed. Margaret 
Harris and Judith Johnston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
p.124. 
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went before, and to the life that is to come after, such as has 
raised the pity and terror of men ever since they began to 
discern between will and destiny.20  
 
This passage blends the language of inheritance with the language of 
tragedy. ‘The hard entail of suffering,’ for example, is charged with both 
moral and legal connotations, meanings for the present and future. The 
phrase points to the sorrows of Mrs Transome which unfold from Chapter 
1 onwards, and ‘entail’ suggests that her present woes are the tragic 
consequences of a guilty past, namely her secret adultery with the lawyer 
Matthew Jermyn, which resulted in the birth of an illegitimate son, 
Harold. However, ‘entail’ also points prophetically to the ill-fated 
‘entailing’ of the Transome estates that comes to light belatedly in 
Chapter 29. In legal terms, ‘entail’ signifies the pursuit of unbroken 
patrilineage, the attempt to transmit property along an indefinite line of 
male successors.  
 
Felix Holt is a story of broken transmission that suggests the futility 
of striving for a perpetual entail, and critiques the aristocratic attitude, 
adopted by decaying gentry like the Transomes, of applying customary 
primogeniture, without questioning its efficacy for family or society. 
Eliot’s diaries indicate that she read John Stuart Mill’s Principles of 
Political Economy (1848) and Henry Fawcett’s The Economic Position of 
the British Labourer (1865).21 In the former book, Mill argued that 
inheritance represented a duty of parents to their children, but stressed 
that  
 
the good not only of society but of the individuals would be 
better consulted by bequeathing to them a moderate, [rather] 
than a large provision.  
 
Primogeniture ensured not only inequitable division of property, but also 
that the eldest child, who inherited significantly more than his siblings, 
was likely to rely solely on his inheritance instead of ‘achieving by [his] 
                                                 
20 Eliot, Felix Holt, p.11. 
21 Eliot’s journals indicate that she read Mill’s book for a second time from May 
28 to July 12, 1865. She also claimed to ‘have been reading Fawcett’s Economic 
condition of the Working Classes [sic]’ and ‘Mill’s [On] Liberty’ in a diary entry 
on November 15, 1865. Felix Holt was written between April 29, 1865 and May 
31, 1866. See The Journals of George Eliot, ed. Margaret Harris and Judith 
Johnston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.124-6. 
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own exertions a successful life.’22 The imbecility of Harold’s father and 
the dissolute life of his older brother support Mill’s theory that 
primogeniture turns eldest sons and heirs into weaklings or idle 
spendthrifts. Focusing on the Transome’s domestic life, Felix Holt is less 
attentive than Mill and Fawcett to the wider economic and social 
consequences of settlement and entailment, but its depiction of Transome 
Court’s falling into a state of disrepair and stagnancy reflected actual 
conditions that land reformers like Fawcett blamed on the over-
concentration of landownership in the hands of an elite, who had few 
incentives to expend capital on improving drainage and agricultural 
productivity in view of such expenditure enriching the eldest son at the 
expense of younger children whose provision needed to be raised by 
mortgages on the estate.23 The critique that Eliot’s novel advanced 
against customs of settlement, entail and primogeniture was situated 
therefore in contemporary debates about what economic policies would 
best promote sustainable and productive land practices that benefit wider 
society, rather than a small group of landowners.  
 
According to land historians, the debates which came to be known as 
the ‘Land Question’ were ‘particularly important at two points during the 
nineteenth century: during the 1840s and from the 1870s onwards.’24 
Both periods of agitation followed the passage of the First and Second 
Reform Bills, and therefore may signify ‘post-Reform’ rumblings. 
Although agitation was not as heated in the 1860s as it became during the 
agricultural depression of the 1870s, the Land Question remained a 
subject of intermittent interest, as demonstrated by Eliot’s reading of 
Fawcett’s book, one among a series of influential publications released by 
the Cobden Club, which sought to revive interest in land reform 
following Anti-Corn Law leader Richard Cobden’s advocacy in 1864 for 
the creation of ‘a League for free trade in Land.’25 The catch-phrase, ‘free 
trade in land,’ became synonymous with calls among liberal and more 
radical reformers for the state to intervene to prevent landowners from 
                                                 
22 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, ed. J. M. Robson (1848; rpt. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1965), bk. II, ch. ii, s. 3, p.221. 
23 Henry Fawcett, The Economic Position of the British Labourer (Cambridge and 
London: Macmillan Press, 1865), p.21. 
24 Matthew Cragoe and Paul Readman, ‘Introduction,’ The Land Question in 
Britain, 1750-1950, ed. Matthew Cragoe and Paul Readman (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.3. 
25 Anthony Howe, ‘The ‘Manchester School’ and the Landlords: The Failure of 
Land Reform in Early Victorian Britain, The Land Question in Britain, p.87. 
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using strict settlement to keep their properties out of the free market 
indefinitely.  
 
Appearing at the cusp of major agitation opposing the rights of 
landowners to continue transmitting their estates to eldest sons ad 
infinitum, the entail on the Transome estate is not only a contrivance that 
precipitates tragedy, but also a signifier of exclusive status, a symbol not 
of social progressivism, but of regression. The linking of Maine to the 
cause of land-law reform was first made in an article for the Westminster 
Review in July 1864.26 Reviewing Mill's Principles of Political Economy 
with Francis Newman’s Lectures on Political Economy (1851), Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics (1851), and Maine’s Ancient Law (1861), the 
article connected four texts which had developed historicised theories of 
social organisation. Maine’s status-contract theory was used to support 
the contention that ‘the tenure of land’ should be grounded in ‘relations 
of men to the State,’ rather than in familial or tribal models of descent.27 
That contract had not taken over from status was indicated by the results 
of the 1861 census, which showed that, of the total British population of 
roughly 20 million, ‘the whole number of landed proprietors [was] stated 
at only 30,766.’28 In June 1866, T. E. Cliffe-Leslie conscripted Maine’s 
ideas more explicitly by opening his article in the Fortnightly Review 
with a quotation from Ancient Law: ‘The society of our day is mainly 
distinguished from that of preceding generations by the largeness of the 
sphere which is occupied in it by contract.’29 He then remarked upon the 
tendency that ‘the jurisprudence of our Courts and of the direct legislation 
of Parliament has been steadily in the opposite direction to that described 
by Mr. Maine.’30 Both articles typified a trend of applying Maine’s 
historical observations to contemporary political affairs that continued 
into the 1870s, provoking him to defend the right of private property in 
his 1875 Rede Lecture.31 As a staunch liberal-conservative, Maine neither 
                                                 
26 ‘The Tenure of Land,’ Westminster Review 82 o.s, 26 n.s. (July 1864): 105-37. 
27 ‘The Tenure of Land,’ p.116. 
28 ‘The Tenure of Land,’ p.123.  
29 T. E. Cliffe-Leslie, ‘Political economy and the tenure of land,’ Fortnightly 
Review 5 (June 1, 1866): 220, quoting from Maine, Ancient Law, p.295. 
30 Cliffe-Leslie, ‘Political economy and the tenure of land,’ p.220. 
31 ‘Nobody is at liberty to attack several property [i.e. individual or private 
property] and to say at the same time that he valued civilisation.’ Henry Sumner 
Maine, ‘The Effects of Observation of India on Modern European Thought,’ Rede 
Lecture 1875, delivered before the University of Cambridge, rpt. in Village 
Communities in East and West, 4th ed. (London: Murray, 1881), p.230. 
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sought nor desired the appropriation of his ideas for perceived socialistic 
purposes, and he rejected claims by the Daily News and the Examiner that 
he was ‘a prophet of agrarian radicalism’ as ‘quite groundless.’32  
 
The linking of Eliot to the Land Question was less overt, as lawyers 
and legal historians read the novel’s purpose as illustrative of how entails 
and base fees operated in practice. Among the legal practitioners who 
admired Felix Holt were Frederic Harrison, who famously assisted Eliot 
with drafting the legal plot,33 and Frederick Pollock (incidentally a great 
admirer of Maine), who praised Eliot for using the base fee  
 
with great effect and with perfect correctness, as part of the 
machinery of the plot; insomuch that conveyancers reading 
the novel have been known to lament seriously, as if the 
thing had happened to one of their own clients, that the 
parties did not take better advice.34  
 
Modern legal historians have also admired Eliot’s accurate deployment of 
the law of entail. Eileen Spring has suggested that ‘George Eliot had 
woven a good story’ around the base fee.35 While lawyers have regarded 
the novel’s ‘legal plot’ more highly than literary critics, their tendency to 
limit the novel to an empirical portrait of ‘law-in-action’ neglected the 
wider political significance of the Transome entail, which appeared in a 
period in which the practices of primogeniture, entails, and strict 
settlements were under increasing scrutiny.  
 
More importantly, they neglected the aesthetic realism of a ‘legal 
plot’ that generates sympathy with as much as criticism of the declining 
                                                 
32 Letter from Maine to John Murray, 12 April 1871, John Murray Archives, qtd. 
by George Feaver, From Status to Contract: A Biography of Sir Henry Maine 
1822-1888 (London and Harlow: Longmans, Green and Co., 1969), p.120. 
33 Eliot’s extensive consultation with Harrison can be traced in her letters from 
January 1866 to June 1866 when she completed the novel. See The George Eliot 
Letters, vol. 4, ed. Gordon S. Haight (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 
pp.214-65. Critical commentary on their correspondence is found in Fred C. 
Thomson, ‘The Legal Plot in Felix Holt,’ Studies in English Literature, 1500-
1900 7.4 (1967): 691-704. 
34 Frederick Pollock, The Land Laws, 2nd ed. (1883; rpt. London: Macmillan, 
1887), p.110. 
35 Spring, Law, Land and Family, p.126. See also: See W. R. Cornish and G. de 
N. Clark, Law and Society in England, 1750-1950 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1989), p.125. 
Sydney Studies                                                       From Status to Contract 
 
61 
gentry class to which the Transomes belong. By weaving the base fee into 
her narrative so that it appears a part of the ‘natural history’ of the landed 
classes, Eliot seems to advocate the notion that ‘Art,’ being the ‘nearest 
thing to life’ and ‘a mode of amplifying experience and extending our 
contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot,’ 
should direct the reader’s sympathy to extend in all directions, with the 
English gentry as well as the peasant or artisan (whose interests were 
represented in her essay, ‘The Natural History of German Life’), or the 
industrialised working class (whose interests are depicted in Felix Holt as 
in conflict with those of the gentry). Workers appear more as a 
background to the central events which shape the Transome tragedy. 
With the exception of a charismatic, anonymous spokesman for working-
class rights in Chapter 30, there are few individualised working-class 
characters in the novel, which features the climax of a rioting mass of 
workers, representing the kind of revolutionary anarchy both feared and 
deplored by Victorian middle-class intellectuals. That Eliot seems 
somewhat ‘out of her element’ when she portrays workers suggests that 
Felix Holt focuses less on Reform Bill discourses of universal suffrage, 
citizenship and representative government than on Land Question 
discourses of the responsibility of the landed classes, community and 
social stability.    
 
However, Felix Holt does more than simply dramatise problems that 
confronted the landed gentry, who are partly responsible for their own 
decline by pandering to anachronistic customs of succession. The novel 
also adds another dimension to the land law debates by making Esther 
Lyon, the adopted daughter of a Dissenting minister, the unexpected but 
rightful legal claimant of Transome Court. Grounded in arguments for 
more equitable distribution of land, the Land Question gave little 
attention to primogeniture, entails, and strict settlements as instruments 
for facilitating and legitimating patriarchy. In contrast to marriage and 
divorce laws—which were more explicitly campaigned against for 
maintaining a sexual double standard that marginalised women—the 
primary objections to the land laws were oriented to interests of class, not 
gender.36 The curious phenomenon in Felix Holt and Eliot’s later novels 
                                                 
36 The gendered nature of the modern history of land law is a theme throughout 
Spring’s feminist-oriented study, Law, Land, and Family. While this article 
focuses on the issue of inheritance, there is extensive critical commentary on the 
agitation of Victorian marriage and divorce law. See, for example, Barbara 
Leckie, Culture and Adultery: The Novel, the Newspaper, and the Law, 1856-
1914 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Mary Lyndon 
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whereby property winds its way circuitously but inevitably to women 
(irrespective of family preference and customary practice) turned readers’ 
attention to gender, rather than class inequality.  
 
Esther’s legal claim reveals that social reality may be the reverse of 
legal assumption. According to Maine, the custom of Agnatic descent, 
which traced genealogy ‘exclusively through males,’ was the basis for ‘a 
memorable legal maxim’: 
 
‘Mulier est finis familiae’—a woman is the terminus of the 
family. A female name closes the branch or twig of the 
genealogy in which it occurs. None of the descendants of a 
female are included in the primitive notion of family 
relationship.37  
 
Contrary to this maxim and common perception, property in Eliot’s 
novels tends to fall eventually to women, rather than men, a pattern seen 
in Felix Holt that is also repeated in Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda, 
where Dorothea Brooke and Gwendolen Harleth become heiresses to 
property that they subsequently reject. Whereas Maine presents 
patriarchal authority in the ancient world as the precedent for patriarchal 
inheritance practices in the nineteenth century, Eliot interrogated the 
politics of male succession, which concealed the necessity of female 
succession at crucial times to ensure familial survival.  
 
Moving from the unprivileged status of a minister’s daughter to the 
privileged one of heiress, Esther may appear to exemplify a Mainian rise 
from status to contract. Her immediate trajectory, however, is simply to 
move from one status to another. Her choices are still limited to marriage 
and inheritance: which man to marry—Harold or Felix; and whether or 
not to accept the estate. Furthermore, she occupies the unusual legal 
status of ‘remainder-man’, a suggestive term for ‘heir of last resort’ 
which raises for Harold the whimsical image of ‘a mendicant sailor with 
a wooden leg.’38 As Neil Hertz suggests, the irony inherent in the legal 
parlance is that ‘a remainder-man may be the remains of a man both 
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déclassé and dismembered.’39 While Esther possesses none of the features 
that might be associated with vestigial humanity, her position is uniquely 
that of ‘quasi-heiress,’ whose succession is more a strange, legal anomaly 
than a natural passage to inheritance.40 Yet the survival and preservation 
of three patrilines—the Durfey, the Transome, and the Bycliffe—seem to 
depend on Esther. 
 
Instead of remaining at a genealogical terminus, Esther finds an 
escape from an identity forged around the elevated status of heiress by 
drawing upon the dual education she receives from her father Rufus Lyon 
and self-appointed tutor Felix Holt. Their respective spiritual and secular 
guidance offer alternative principles to property by which to define her 
identity. Neither provides flawless guidance. Esther learns to appreciate 
the truth of Felix’s lesson (designed to turn her from ‘idle fancy and 
selfish inclination’) that her ‘father’s principles are greater and worthier 
than what guides [her] life.’41 Yet, Lyon’s ‘theory of providential 
arrangement’ provides ‘no illumination’ for Esther on the question of 
whether to accept the Transome estate.42 Felix’s secular philosophy is 
also problematic, as, although he preaches renunciation as a natural 
course for those (like himself) who do not consider wealth as ‘any 
peculiar virtue,’ he does not realise that renouncing his love for Esther 
will prove more difficult than renouncing material goods. By marrying 
Esther in the end, he compromises his ideal of celibacy, and learns to 
strike a balance between worthy and needless sacrifice. 
 
The fallibility of both religious and secular belief systems leads 
Esther to the realisation that she must forge her own principles. Finding 
her own alternative to complete renunciation, she leaves Transome Court 
and refuses the bulk of her inheritance, but marries Felix, claiming for 
herself and her husband only two pounds a week, plus ‘a little income’ 
for Felix’s mother, ‘enough for her to live as she had been used to live,’ 
and a similar income for her father, ‘to save him from being dependent 
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when he is no longer able to preach’ (396). The course she chooses 
allows her to fulfil her duties to family, but also to avoid the constraints 
on self-determination imposed by her legal status. Esther therefore 
accepts a qualified independence or individualism, not the full severance 
from family bonds and commitments that Maine regarded as indicative of 
contractual freedom and individual autonomy.  
 
It appears at the conclusion of the novel that the reader is left in the 
double bind that characterises Victorian endings for its feminine 
characters, for whom ‘there is no readier conduit for directing [their] 
desire [to do something important] than through marriage with already 
focused and determined men.’43 The radicalism of Felix Holt, however, is 
that it depicts a woman rejecting the bulk of property to which she is 
entitled, accepting only the small amount needed to care for family. The 
striking of a balance between individual and family welfare is the 
measure of truly ethical behaviour in Eliot’s late fiction. Although 
generally given lowest priority in the order of succession, daughters, 
rather than fathers and sons, are the ones who prove their worth by 
embracing an alternative to the status economy, in which landed 
inheritance is the basis of wealth, power, and social position.  
 
 
Middlemarch 
 
Although less fixated on legal technicalities than Felix Holt, 
Middlemarch features not just one, but three main inheritance plots. The 
detailed legal briefs laying out the whole history of the Transome 
settlement are replaced by Dorothea’s ethical question in Chapter 37—
’Was inheritance a question of liking or of responsibility?’—which 
occurs while she ponders the disinheritance of Casaubon’s ‘Aunt Julia’ 
(the grandmother of Will Ladislaw), ‘only because she had chosen [to 
marry] a man who was poor’:  
 
Dorothea … had wrought herself into some independent 
clearness as to the historical, political reasons why eldest 
sons had superior rights, and why land should be entailed: 
those reasons, impressing her with a certain awe, might be 
weightier than she knew, but here was a question of ties 
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which left them uninfringed. Here was a daughter [Julia] 
whose child—even according to the ordinary aping of 
aristocratic institutions by people who are no more 
aristocratic than retired grocers, and who have no more land 
to ‘keep together’ than a lawn and a paddock—would have a 
prior claim. Was inheritance a question of liking or of 
responsibility? All the energy of Dorothea’s nature went on 
the side of responsibility—the fulfilment of claims founded 
on our own deeds, such as marriage and parentage.44  
 
Dorothea’s weighing up of individual ‘liking’ and familial 
‘responsibility’ seems to be an attempt to determine whether status or 
contract ought to prevail. On one hand, her belief that ‘the fulfilment of 
claims’ should be ‘founded on … marriage and parentage’ suggests her 
preference for a status-based view of inheritance that privileges the 
claims of legal ties and biological kinship. On the other hand, the claim of 
Aunt Julia that Dorothea believes ought to have been fulfilled is founded 
on personal ‘deeds,’ and therefore, decisions about inheritance should rest 
on integrity of character, rather than on concerns about decline in class 
status, resulting from a socially disadvantageous marriage. Like Esther 
Lyon, Dorothea’s ethical judgement seems to be suspended between 
status and contract.  
 
Dorothea’s interrogation of primogeniture is commensurate with her 
passion for land reform, which is evident from the beginning of the novel 
in her ‘impatience of her uncle’s talk or his way of ‘letting things be’ on 
his estate’ and her longing ‘for the time when she would be of age and 
have some command of money for generous schemes.’45 Her sympathy 
with impoverished tenants echoes the sentiments of reformers, like Henry 
Fawcett, who drew attention to the plight of tenants and labourers. ‘I 
think we deserve to be beaten out of our beautiful houses with a scourge 
of small cords—all of us who let tenants live in such sties as we see 
round us,’ she says to James Chettam, the baronet who courts her. The 
inconsistency in Dorothea’s character, however, is suggested by her 
decision not to marry Chettam, who shows a willingness to indulge her 
passion for land reform, but Casaubon, a scholar and clergyman who does 
‘not care about building cottages’ for the poor or ‘about the philanthropic 
side of things.’46   
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Dorothea also misjudges Casaubon’s ‘sense of right,’47 which she 
thinks would make him amenable to changing his will in favour of his 
cousin Ladislaw, whose grandmother’s disinheritance keeps him poor. 
Instead of agreeing with her concerns for Ladislaw, Casaubon’s ‘power 
of suspicious construction’ is agitated ‘into exasperated activity,’ as he 
imagines his cousin making ‘an easy conquest’ and ‘entering into [his] 
nest’ by marrying Dorothea after his death.48 His last will and testament 
reflects his jealousy, as it bequeaths not only the fruitless task of 
completing his life’s work, the ‘Key to all Mythologies,’ but also contains 
a codicil that gives all his property to Dorothea on condition that she does 
not marry Ladislaw. Thus he take advantage of Dorothea’s dutiful nature 
towards him and his work, and, as James Chettam observes, ‘most 
unfairly compromise[s]’ her by provoking rumours of an affair between 
her and Will, and exploiting provincial gossip and public scandal to 
prevent their marriage.49 Casaubon’s will exemplifies the power of ‘the 
dead hand’ (the title of Book V), an instrument used both to defend his 
status and reputation as husband, and to assert his control over the living 
from beyond the grave by putting them under contractual obligation to 
his testamentary desires.  
 
The abuse of testamentary power is demonstrated not only by 
Casaubon but also by the wealthy Peter Featherstone, who enjoys 
tormenting his siblings and nephew Fred Vincy by making tantalising 
references to the unlikelihood of their receiving anything in his will. 
However, unlike Casaubon, whose ‘dead hand’ is not rendered powerless 
until the end of the novel, Featherstone’s impotence over his family is 
literally and symbolically represented immediately upon his decease:  
 
Peter Featherstone was dead, with his right hand clasping the 
keys [to the iron chest containing his wills], and his left hand 
lying on the heap of notes and gold.50  
 
Mary Garth’s refusal to accede to Featherstone’s request for her to burn 
one of his wills results in her friend Fred Vincy losing a ten-thousand-
pound bequest, and the disappointment of a testator, whose power to 
control the destiny of his property is removed when he cannot prevail 
upon his carer to carry out his intentions. Featherstone’s posthumous 
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authority over his affairs is dealt a further blow later in the novel when 
his illegitimate son and heir Joshua Rigg sells his father’s property, Stone 
Court, to Nicholas Bulstrode, a banker he despises. In labyrinthine 
fashion, however, Featherstone’s property eventually makes its way to 
Fred, who becomes manager of Stone Court through an unusual act of 
kindness by Bulstrode.  
 
Although not introduced until Book VI, the novel’s third inheritance 
plot provides for the resolution of the first two plots. Whereas Casaubon 
attempts to deny Will the inheritance of his paternal grandmother Julia, 
Bulstrode is responsible for denying him the inheritance of his maternal 
grandmother Mrs Dunkirk, whom he deceived by keeping secret the 
whereabouts of her run-away daughter Sarah. The deception allowed 
Bulstrode to inherit the widowed Mrs Dunkirk’s fortune when they 
married, as the latter was prevented from benefiting the grandchild she 
never knew she had. However, after his purchase of Stone Court from 
Joshua Rigg, the past threatens to engulf him, as Raffles, the 
unscrupulous spy who was hired to find Sarah, reappears to demand 
money as the price of secrecy. Casaubon refuses to recognise Will’s 
claim and in fact hinders it by a testamentary clause, but in order to save 
his reputation, Bulstrode admits: ‘you have a claim on me, Mr Ladislaw: 
as I said before, not a legal claim, but one which my conscience 
recognises.’51 His offer to Will of a five hundred pound annuity during 
his life and ‘a proportional capital’ at his death arrives hot on the heels of 
Raffles’ queries about his mother, and it is rejected on the same basis that 
his mother had run away to avoid enjoying any part of the ‘profits’ which 
her father’s pawnbroking business ‘made out of lost souls.’52 ‘My 
unblemished honour is important to me,’ he tells Bulstrode.  
 
‘It is important to me to have no stain on my birth and 
connections. And now I find there is a stain which I can’t 
help. My mother felt it, and tried to keep as clear of it as she 
could, and so will I.’53  
 
By rejecting an income from Bulstrode, Will becomes the representative 
of ‘three successive generations of disinheritance.’54  
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Will’s renunciation of wealth prepares the reader for Dorothea’s even 
more momentous renunciation of her husband’s money. The sudden onset 
of a thunderstorm creates an apocalyptic setting for the two lovers to 
acknowledge to each other for the first time the forces which divide them. 
The image of Dorothea and Will,  
 
their hands clasped, like two children, looking out on the 
storm, while the thunder gave a tremendous crack and roll 
above them, and the rain began to pour down,55  
 
evokes the last scene of The Mill on the Floss, where the siblings Tom 
and Maggie Tulliver are joined together before the river sweeps them to 
their deaths. Similar apocalyptic language is noticeable in the scene of 
Deronda’s parting from Gwendolen in George Eliot's last novel, Daniel 
Deronda. Whereas Gwendolen’s liberation from an egotistical world-
view coincides with her parting from Deronda, Dorothea’s ‘soul’ is 
‘liberated from its terrible conflict’ before her meeting with Will, which 
opens as a scene of parting but ends as a scene of reunion (704). 
Dorothea’s act of renouncing Casaubon’s money takes place during an 
uncharacteristic outburst, in which the emotions repressed to silence 
while she was married to Casaubon and by his will, are finally let out: 
 
‘Oh, I cannot bear it—my heart will break,’ said Dorothea, 
starting from her seat, the flood of her young passion bearing 
down all the obstructions which had kept her silent—the great 
tears rising and falling in an instant: ‘I don’t mind about 
poverty—I hate my wealth.’56 
 
Instead of freeing Will from the poverty which was his portion from his 
female forebears, Dorothea joins his grandmother Julia’s and mother 
Sarah’s legacy of marital recklessness by marrying Ladislaw outside 
legal, domestic and social propriety. Despite the adverse effect of her 
decision to her economic circumstances, particularly from her family’s 
perspective, Dorothea condemns herself only to genteel poverty—she still 
has her own income of seven hundred a year—while she gains the man 
she loves and a happy home life. Her marriage to Casaubon had been 
sterile, and it seemed as though her sister Celia, who had married James 
Chettam and given birth to a baby son, would become the mother of the 
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heir to the Brooke family’s estate. With Ladislaw, Dorothea has a son of 
her own. 
 
Before the novel concludes, it returns briefly to the problem of the 
entail, as Mr Brooke suggests half-heartedly to Chettam that he could ‘cut 
off the entail’ as a sign of disapproval of Dorothea’s second marriage. 
Although hostile to Ladislaw and realising that Brooke’s proposal would 
unite Tipton Grange and his own estate (a ‘prospect that flattered him for 
his son and heir’), Chettam’s honour prevents him from encouraging 
Brooke to take such drastic action as disinheriting Dorothea’s son.57 
(730). The decision of Chettam and Brooke not to take punitive action 
against Dorothea for the mere sake of propriety ends a family history of 
disinheritances. The withholding or conferring of inheritances on the 
basis of individual ‘liking’ is finally replaced by the choosing of an heir 
on the basis of family ‘responsibility.’ 
 
 
Daniel Deronda 
 
Whereas Felix Holt and Middlemarch explore questions of inheritance 
and succession as they present themselves in English law, Eliot’s last 
novel considers alternative principles of inheritance in Jewish law and 
culture. The one major difference between English and Jewish law was 
that the latter allowed inheritance through the maternal line. Daniel 
Deronda is adopted by Sir Hugo Mallinger, but the money for his 
education and upbringing derives from his grandfather’s fortune, which is 
transmitted to him through his mother Leonora Charisi. As in Eliot’s 
earlier fiction, matrilineal inheritance is as much a feature of the narrative 
as patrilineal. However, it is important to recognise that Eliot does not 
present the Jewish conception of inheritance as ideal in comparison with 
the English. The dominance of patriarchy is as entrenched in Hebrew as 
in Gentile tradition. Only a young male ‘Jew, intellectually cultured, 
morally fervid’ can qualify as the ideal type to whom Mordecai yearns to 
transplant his spiritual life.58 Deronda’s grandfather, a strict orthodox 
Jew, cared for his daughter Leonora only ‘as a makeshift link’ between 
himself and an unborn grandson to whom he hoped to transmit his 
spiritual legacy.59 
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Deronda’s final parting from Gwendolen suggests that the novel does 
not ultimately provide for an ideal union between English and Jewish 
cultures. Eliot appears to have wanted her story to be ‘something new,’ 
rather than ‘merely another installment of the same old thing, the English 
novel of marriage and inheritance.’60 As in Felix Holt, she consulted 
Frederic Harrison for advice about the law of settlement while writing 
Daniel Deronda. Her letters to Harrison suggest that she may have 
considered legitimisation by act of Parliament as a course by which 
Deronda, who is suspected of being Sir Hugo Mallinger’s illegitimate 
son, could succeed to the Mallinger estates, and perhaps also a peerage.61 
Eliot’s departure from this early plan by giving Deronda a Jewish 
parentage ensured that he is not set up simply as a rival to Grandcourt’s 
heirship (as Esther was to Harold in Felix Holt, or Ladislaw to Casaubon 
in Middlemarch), but that his future would lie beyond the materialism of 
landed estates, and even beyond English shores.  
 
Deronda’s departure from the conventional English inheritance plot, 
however, does not free him completely from the burden of being perhaps 
the last surviving male of several Jewish families. The failure of the male 
line is a very real prospect for the English Mallingers, whose estates have 
run ‘together into the single heirship of a mealy-complexioned male,’ 
Henleigh Mallinger Grandcourt.62 But like their English counterparts, 
Deronda’s ancestors have also struggled to perpetuate the patriline. At 
Genoa, his mother tells him that his real name is Daniel Charisi. Before 
his adoption by Sir Hugo, she changed his name to ‘Deronda,’ a ‘branch 
of the family’ which her ‘father had lost sight of.’63 The Charisi, Deronda 
tells Mordecai, were a ‘strain that has ardently maintained the fellowship 
of our race—a line of Spanish Jews that has borne many students and 
men of practical power.’64 In his second interview with his mother, he 
learns that his maternal grandmother ‘was a Morteira,’65 a family of 
Portuguese Jews of Sephardic (Iberian) origin, who ‘were regarded as a 
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kind of aristocratic stock.’66 Despite the aristocratic blood from both 
maternal and paternal sides of his family, Deronda is not very dissimilar 
to Grandcourt, as he may be the terminus of two, possibly even three, 
Jewish patrilines—the Charisi, the Morteira, and the Deronda. 
 
Instead of attempting to deny his Jewish heritage, Deronda seeks to 
confirm his status and racial identity, without allowing it to burden him as 
it burdened his mother. For a lengthy period of the novel, his status is an 
imposition on his freedom, as he feels that Mordecai’s will for him to be 
his spiritual heir is as constrictive as the ‘grasp of [a] dying hand.’67 
Known by his friends as virtually incapable of withholding his sympathy 
from anyone, Deronda’s wide-ranging sympathy is tested to its limits by 
Mordecai’s will for him to become not simply an amanuensis for 
transcribing a spiritual vision, but to identify with Mordecai completely. 
Mordecai insists that Deronda ‘be not only a hand to [him], but a soul,—
believing my belief … seeing the vision I point to—beholding a glory 
where I behold it!’68 He desires the preservation of his consumptive, 
dying self and the transmission of his ideals to a ‘more beautiful… 
stronger… executive self,’ and expects Deronda to fulfil his Cabbalistic 
desire for a union between their two souls.69  
 
‘You will be my life: it will be planted afresh; it will 
grow. You shall take the inheritance; it has been gathering 
for ages … you will take the sacred inheritance of the Jew.’70  
 
This is a far more radical form of succession than is provided for under 
any settlement, will, or entail in English law.  
 
Like Esther and Dorothea in Eliot’s earlier novels, Deronda finds a 
way of reconciling himself with his inheritance, without allowing his 
newfound status as a Jew to determine his life completely. After his 
mother confirms his Jewish blood, he travels to Mainz to collect a chest 
that his grandfather had left in trust for him. But when the trustee of the 
chest, Joseph Kalonymos, asks him whether he will call himself ‘a Jew 
and profess the faith of [his] fathers,’ Deronda resists unqualified 
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commitment to the nationalistic aims which Mordecai and Kalonymos 
wish him to fulfil, as he says:  
 
‘I shall call myself a Jew. But I will not say that I shall 
profess to believe exactly as my fathers have believed. Our 
fathers themselves changed the horizon of their belief and 
learned of other races. But I think I can maintain my 
grandfather’s notion of separateness with communication. I 
hold that my first duty is toward my own people, and if there 
is anything to be done towards restoring or perfecting their 
common life, I shall make that my vocation.’71  
 
Deronda is perhaps too aware of the dangers of cultural insularity, which 
turned his mother against her racial and spiritual heritage, and therefore  
 
at no point, crucially, does [he] explicitly embrace 
Mordecai’s conception of guaranteed cultural transmission, 
or his vision of an ignited race consciousness that will 
automatically enact Israel’s destiny.72  
 
Deronda also suggests that ‘separateness with communication’ or 
dialogical interaction between Jewish and other races is the path forward. 
Deronda’s Jewish inheritance offers him a way out of the conventional 
marriage and inheritance plot, but he must negotiate the extent to which 
he allows his Jewish inheritance to determine his actions. To turn the 
‘dead hand’ of the past into a living and worthwhile vocation, he reserves 
for himself the contractual freedom to support the Zionist cause on his 
own terms, a freedom he otherwise would be denied if he submitted 
completely to the wishes of Mordecai.  
 
Deronda’s unique journey is depicted alongside the more 
conventional marriage and inheritance plot in which Gwendolen Harleth 
is entangled. Whereas Deronda struggles at first with his new Jewish 
status, Gwendolen Harleth struggles under her husband Grandcourt’s 
despotic authority. Grandcourt, whose ‘importance as a subject of this 
realm was of the grandly passive kind which consists in the inheritance of 
land,’73 is entirely a creature of status, which he owes to his uncle Sir 
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Hugo Mallinger’s misfortune of failing to father a son. Like Transome 
Court in Felix Holt and Tipton Grange in Middlemarch, the estates of the 
aristocratic Mallingers in Daniel Deronda are entailed strictly to males as 
a consequence of an ‘ill-devised settlement which [Sir Hugo’s] father, Sir 
Francis, had chosen to make by will.’74 Sir Hugo is the life tenant of three 
estates—the oldest, King’s Topping, granted to ‘a certain Hugues le 
Malingre, who came in with the Conqueror,’ Monk’s Topping, granted to 
the Mallingers ‘under Henry the Eighth,’ and Diplow Hall, ‘a 
comparatively landless place which had come into the family from a rich 
lawyer on the female side who wore the perruque of the Restoration.’75 
Under the settlement, all three properties are entailed to male heirs. Sir 
Hugo is particularly disappointed that ‘Diplow with its modicum of land 
had been left under the same conditions as the ancient and wide 
inheritance of the two Toppings,’ as he regards it as a place ‘where his 
wife and daughters ought to have been able to retire after his death.’76 
Grandcourt views Diplow as simply one (and certainly not the most 
impressive) estate among five which he expects to own in future, as in 
addition to the Mallinger estates, he has already inherited Ryelands and 
Gadsmere from his father, who died early. Whereas Grandcourt does not 
value Diplow highly, his uncle anxiously hopes that ‘Grandcourt might 
consent to a transaction by which he would get a good sum of ready 
money’ in exchange for Diplow.77 
 
Sir Hugo’s plans for Diplow, which ‘fretted him rather more than if 
it had concerned Church discipline or the ballot,’ are an integral part of 
the socio-legal fabric of the novel.78 The desired property transaction 
does not occupy as intrusive a place in the narrative as the base fee in 
Felix Holt, but is deftly used by Eliot to reveal the kind of tension 
between life tenant and heir, which can easily arise between ‘men in that 
relation.’ Eliot requested advice from Harrison on how to create ‘ 
 
certain conditions … which would make them [life tenant 
and heir] wish to suppress any show of dislike and would 
give them a mutual sense of self-interest in being friendly.79  
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Thus we see Sir Hugo suppressing his dislike of Grandcourt for the sake 
of his wife and daughters. Grandcourt considers ‘his uncle a superfluity 
and a bore,’ but tolerates Sir Hugo because he is ‘gratified to have the 
alternative of the money in his mind,’ and is ‘flattered’ by the prospect of 
‘being able to refuse what Sir Hugo desire[s].’80 Neither can act without 
the other’s consent, and until they can reach contractual agreement, they 
are both powerless. However, Sir Hugo the life tenant is rendered more 
powerless than his heir, as he knows that, after his death, Grandcourt will 
become the absolute ‘master over [his] estates, present or future,’ and will 
have the right to choose his own heir.81 The settlement gives Sir Hugo 
limited bargaining power with Grandcourt, and with a family of four to 
provide for, he is burdened by greater responsibilities than his bachelor 
nephew, who is eventually prevailed upon to sell Diplow only after he 
marries Gwendolen.  
 
In the context of the whole novel, the Diplow transaction is a 
relatively minor incident. But the symbolic significance of Diplow 
outweighs its narrative importance. Despite the Mallingers’ adherence to 
primogeniture, the property ironically comes from ‘a rich lawyer on the 
female side,’ and is therefore a matrilineal inheritance.82 Not only does 
Diplow come to Grandcourt from the female side, but his father’s 
properties also belonged originally to his mother’s side of the family. 
Upon marrying a Miss Grandcourt, his father had  
 
taken her name along with her estates, thus making a 
junction between two equally old families, impaling the 
three Saracens’ heads proper and three bezants of the one 
with the tower and falcons argent of the other…83  
 
While, on the symbolic level, it is the feminine coat-of-arms (the 
Grandcourt family’s tower and falcons) that impales the symbols on the 
                                                 
80 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.160. 
81 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.284. 
82 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.165. 
83 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.166. The ‘three Saracens’ heads’ and ‘three bezants’ 
are symbols on the coat-of-arms of the Mallinger family. In his cursory 
exploration of the Mallinger family tree, Daniel admits to being interested ‘only 
about that ancestor who had killed three Saracens in one encounter’ (p.171). The 
early Mallingers’ pride in their military success in the Crusades against Muslim 
Saracens is an ancient precedent of the conflict between Western and Eastern 
culture explored in the novel.  
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masculine coat-of-arms (the Mallingers’ Saracens’ heads and bezants),  it 
is the male side of the family which takes the estates of the female. In 
addition to giving her son Ryelands and Gadsmere, Mrs Mallinger (née 
Grandcourt) also transmits  
 
a baronial streak to his blood, so that if certain intervening 
persons slightly painted in the middle distance died, he 
would become a baron and peer of this realm.84  
 
From his uncle, Grandcourt will inherit only a baronetcy, an inferior title 
to the barony from his mother. Although his full name is ‘Henleigh 
Mallinger Grandcourt,’ he is known and addressed by all as ‘Grandcourt,’ 
a patronym which is underwritten by maternal authority. 
 
Grandcourt relies passively on his status, but he is a masterful 
exploiter of contract as a means of extending his dominion over others. 
His choice of Gwendolen as his bride (and rejection of the wealthier 
Catherine Arrowpoint) is motivated by a powerful, spontaneous wish ‘to 
be completely master of this creature—this combination of maidenliness 
and mischief.’85 In fact Gwendolen’s financial plight improves her 
marital prospects, as Grandcourt knows that his economic status will only 
enhance his authority as a husband. In Chapter 27, the scene of 
Grandcourt’s proposal, he adopts the pose of an ardent lover to a girl 
playing hard-to-get, but in hindsight, Gwendolen realises that the scene 
had been the enactment of a contract, the terms of which were framed 
entirely by Grandcourt, although she had thought at the time that ‘there 
had been a tacit part of the contract on her side—namely, that she meant 
to rule and have her own way.’86 Her status as a wife is undermined by 
the fact that she accepted Grandcourt, despite having promised his 
mistress Lydia Glasher that she would not marry him and therefore 
become an obstacle to the inheritance of Lydia’s son. Grandcourt knows 
about Gwendolen’s meeting with Lydia at Cardell Chase through Mr 
Lush, the man responsible for its arrangement, but is ignorant about his 
wife’s sense of contractual obligation to his mistress.  
 
Grandcourt’s incomplete knowledge about his wife’s conscience 
renders his mastery over her ‘imperfect.’87 Ironically, this imperfection is 
                                                 
84 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.91. 
85 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.301. 
86 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.669. 
87 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.352. 
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revealed by the narrator at a point in which Grandcourt’s power appears 
supreme—his confronting Gwendolen with the contents of his will. In the 
event that Gwendolen bears ‘no son an issue of her marriage,’ Lydia’s 
son, young Henleigh, would be Grandcourt’s heir.88 Like Casaubon in 
Middlemarch, Grandcourt uses his will as a ‘dead hand’ to burden and 
disgrace his wife. Gwendolen is given residence in Gadsmere, a secluded 
house in a coal-mining district, and an annual provision of two thousand 
pounds, moderately wealthy by middle-class standards, but meagre in 
relation to the vastness of Grandcourt’s wealth. Whereas Lydia, 
unsuccessful during Grandcourt’s life in claiming the position of his wife, 
is dignified after his death by the will which makes her son an heir to all 
his father’s estates, Gwendolen is forced to take the place of her 
husband’s mistress, and occupy Gadsmere, which signifies a kind of 
Dantesque purgatory for the discarded, unloved woman, seeking but 
never achieving the status of a wife. As if forcing his wife to exchange 
positions with Lydia is insufficient punishment, Grandcourt intensifies 
Gwendolen’s humiliation by forcing her to hear the terms of his will 
delivered by his former secretary Lush, who had been sent away at 
Gwendolen’s request before she agreed to marry Grandcourt. The act of 
re-employing Lush as his spokesman represents a breach of their marital 
contract, and it further consigns Gwendolen to a status lower than that of 
a secretary, whose services are required and terminated at Grandcourt’s 
pleasure.  
 
There is a vengeful aspect to Grandcourt’s will, which is related to 
jealousy of Gwendolen as his exclusive possession. Unlike Casaubon, 
whose codicil exposes his jealousy of Dorothea and Ladislaw, 
Grandcourt does not make Gwendolen’s inheritance of Gadsmere 
conditional on her not marrying Deronda. As he considers Deronda to be 
far beneath him in status, the omission is unsurprising, but his 
consignment of Gwendolen to Gadsmere is perhaps intended to divide 
her from Deronda. After witnessing Gwendolen’s attempt to attract 
Deronda’s notice by wearing her father’s necklace as a wrist bracelet, he 
rebukes her harshly for acting in a ‘damnably vulgar’ way, but asserts 
confidently that Deronda ‘is not going to take [his] place.’89 When he 
makes his will, his ‘state of mind’ is again described as not one of 
‘jealousy,’ but the narrator’s equivocations suggest otherwise: ‘his 
behaviour in some respects was as like jealousy as yellow is to yellow, 
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89 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.447. 
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which colour we know may be the effect of very different causes.’90 By 
keeping his wife as far as possible from Deronda and the social circles 
which befit her rank, Grandcourt’s will is a defensive ploy designed to 
safeguard his public reputation, even at the expense of his wife’s dignity. 
 
Eliot further undermines Grandcourt’s assurance in his psychological 
power by revealing the partiality of his knowledge about his wife’s 
psyche:  
 
He had correctly divined one half of Gwendolen’s dread—
all that related to her personal pride, and her perception that 
his will must conquer hers; but the remorseful half, even if 
he had known of her broken promise [to Lydia], was as 
much out of his imagination as the other side of the moon. 
… There is no escaping the fact that want of sympathy 
condemns us to a corresponding stupidity. Mephistopheles 
thrown upon real life, and obliged to manage his own plots, 
would inevitably make blunders.91  
 
Although Mephistophelian in his ability to abuse the fears and 
weaknesses of others (particularly women), Grandcourt’s perceptions are 
rendered ‘stupid’ by his lack of ‘sympathy’ with those he oppresses. He 
can fathom the idea that Gwendolen might hate the prospect of becoming 
a mother because she despises him, but he cannot perceive that she does 
not want a son because of a guilty conscience. ‘Gwendolen felt that to 
desire a child for herself would have been consenting to the completion 
of the injury she had been guilty of.’92 Her husband fails to attribute her 
dread to the fear of bearing a son who would override the claim of young 
Henleigh to Grandcourt’s estates. Even Gwendolen herself does not seem 
to realise at the time that her guilt about having a child with Grandcourt 
was a sign that she had put Deronda’s advice into practice by using her 
fear as a safeguard against moral compromise and as a catalyst for her 
moral redemption.  
 
The Mediterranean yachting trip, which Grandcourt intended as an 
opportunity for him ‘to feel more securely that [Gwendolen] was his to 
do as he liked with,’ ends in his drowning at the Bay of Genoa.93 By 
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92 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.672. 
93 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.668. 
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imposing his ‘will like that of a crab or a boa-constrictor,’ Grandcourt 
had been ‘pinching’ and ‘crushing’ Gwendolen to the point of paralysis.94 
Gwendolen views his death as a willed murder—by failing to cast out a 
line to save him, she feels that she had intentionally ‘resisted his will’ and 
thus ‘kill[ed] him in [her] thoughts.’95 The ‘white hand of his’ which she 
feared ‘was capable … of clinging round her neck and threatening to 
throttle her’ is now a dead hand,96 but it is just as capable of strangling 
her as it was when alive. Her burden of guilt enhances the prospect of 
strangulation. But Gwendolen’s liberation is signified not by her release 
from the grasp of her husband’s psychological tyranny, but by her 
decision partially to accept the terms of Grandcourt’s will. While she is at 
first hesitant towards claiming any provision, Deronda comforts her by 
saying that she ought not to feel as though taking the money were ‘a 
crime towards one who is dead.’97 Following his advice, Gwendolen also 
decides not to limit the amount she accepts to eight hundred a-year, the 
amount which had been given to her mother while Grandcourt lived, but 
accepts the full two thousand pounds for her mother’s and her own use. 
 
What Gwendolen rejects is residence at Gadsmere. She is assisted to 
achieve this end by Sir Hugo, who, on hearing about Grandcourt’s will 
and the disgrace which it inflicted on Gwendolen by its ‘conspicuous 
publishing of her husband’s relation to Mrs Glasher,’ is moved to suggest 
an alternative.98 He offers to help Gwendolen to lease Gadsmere ‘on 
capital terms’ to a man engaged in the coal-mining industry.99 After her 
mother reveals that Offendene, the house she lived in before her 
marriage, is empty, she finds her own alternative to the life which her 
husband had planned for her. Gwendolen’s resolution to live at 
Offendene with her mother and sisters marks a crucial turning-point in 
her movement from egotism. At the beginning of the novel, no home 
seemed adequate to her queenly desires and needs. Chapter 3 opens with 
the narrator’s declaration:  
 
Pity that Offendene was not the home of Miss Harleth’s 
childhood, or endeared to her by family memories! A human 
life, I think, should be well rooted in some spot of a native 
                                                 
94 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.423. 
95 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, pp. 693 and 695. 
96 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.427. 
97 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.767. 
98 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.758. 
99 Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p.761. 
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land, where it may get the love of tender kinship for the face 
of earth … a spot where the definiteness of early memories 
may be inwrought with affection, and kindly acquaintance 
with all neighbours, even to the dogs and donkeys, may 
spread not by sentimental effort and reflection, but as a 
sweet habit of the blood.100  
 
No longer ‘a quiet home which had once seemed a dullness to be fled 
from,’ Offendene promises to be a ‘spot of … native land’ with which 
Gwendolen can learn to achieve a ‘tender kinship.’101 She may still be far 
from achieving this kinship, but she is as close as any of the English 
characters in the novel to such achievement. Although Deronda seems to 
face more significant geographical and political barriers before he can 
succeed in ‘restoring a political existence to [his] people, making them a 
nation again, giving them a national centre,’ his quest is not presented as 
more difficult than Gwendolen’s.102 Her final moral resolution to ‘live’ 
and ‘be better’ will be as challenging as the nationalistic task which he 
has accepted from Mordecai.103  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The law becomes progressively less prominent as we move from Felix 
Holt to Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda, but its subtle and elliptical 
presence suggests how Victorian anxieties about inheritance and 
succession were related to their attempts to reform social arrangements 
without losing touch with their cultural traditions. Inheritance is 
presented by Eliot as an enervating possession in the hands of those, like 
Casaubon and Grandcourt, who covet and exploit only the status it 
confers, but an opportunity for those, like Esther, Dorothea, Gwendolen, 
and Daniel, who accept a portion of their inheritances without 
surrendering their personal independence or right to decide their course 
apart from familial responsibilities. Reaching a pragmatic compromise 
between status and contract, rather than a complete movement from one 
condition to the other, is the preferred course of action—inheritance in 
moderation, a practice supported by land law reformers, political 
economists, and novelists. By reading Maine in dialogue with Eliot, and 
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Sydney Studies                                                       From Status to Contract 
 
80 
using the former’s status-contract theory as a conceptual model with 
which to illuminate the contradictory emphasis in social discourse on 
both family and individual rights, it is possible to show how the 
interconnections between jurisprudence and literature contributed to the 
formation of a juridical imaginary, the contours of which are seen most 
clearly in the inheritance plots of Victorian fiction. 
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